USA v. Rohan Providence by unknown
2010 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
4-23-2010 
USA v. Rohan Providence 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2010 
Recommended Citation 
"USA v. Rohan Providence" (2010). 2010 Decisions. 1461. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2010/1461 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2010 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
1     NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS




UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
v.
ROHAN PROVIDENCE,
     Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Virgin Islands
Division of St. Croix
(Crim. No. 1-07-CR-00051-001)
District Judge: Hon. Anne E. Thompson
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
December 4, 2009
Before: McKEE, FUENTES, and NYGAARD Circuit Judges.
OPINION
McKEE, Circuit Judge.
Appellant Rohan Providence appeals the district court’s order denying his motion
for judgment of acquittal and argues acquittal was warranted because the government
failed to prove the elements of the offenses charged beyond a reasonable doubt.  For the
following reasons, we will affirm.
2I.     FACTS AND PROCEDURAL POSTURE
We write primarily for the parties and therefore need not set forth the factual or
procedural history in extensive detail.  In July 2007, the High Intensity Drug Trafficking
Area (“HIDTA”) Office of St. Croix received a tip that marijuana was being cultivated in
an abandoned structure in a secluded area surrounded by overgrown vegetation.  See Joint
Appendix, United States v. Rohan Providence, No. 08-3670 at 19-21 (filed April 1, 2009)
(“J.A.”).  Officer Christopher Howell and other HIDTA agents investigated, discovered
marijuana plants growing in cups and trays in the abandoned structure, and set up covert
surveillance equipment to record any illicit activity.  J.A. 21-31; 40-42.  Thereafter, two
individuals were recorded watering and brushing excess dirt from the marijuana plants
over an eleven day period.  J.A. 41-42, 52-53, 80-81, 119-46; see also Government’s Exs.
11B and 11C (“11B and 11C”).
The task force also stopped a vehicle that had been parked outside the secluded
cultivation site and identified Providence as the passenger.  His co-defendant, Surash
Rampersad, was the driver.  J.A. 210-11, 214-17, 231-36.  Later that day, the officer who
pulled over the car watched the surveillance footage from the cultivation site and
identified Providence and Rampersad as the two individuals “messing with some plants,”
which were later proven to be marijuana.  See Exs. 11B and 11C; J.A. 80-81, 239-40. 
In November 2007, a jury convicted Providence and Rampersad of “aiding and
abetting one another” in the: (1) possession with intent to distribute in excess of one
3hundred marijuana plants (“Count I”); (2) manufacturing in excess of one hundred
marijuana plants (“Count II”); and (3) use of a premises to manufacture marijuana
(“Count III”).  J.A. 1-5.  The jury affirmatively answered two interrogatories specifically
finding beyond a reasonable doubt that the quantity of marijuana involved in Counts I and
II was in excess of one hundred plants.  J.A. 12-14. 
Providence subsequently moved for a judgment of acquittal, arguing that the
evidence only established his “mere presence,” and was insufficient to establish his
participation in the offenses.  J.A. 272-73.  He also argued that the government failed to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that his conduct involved over one hundred marijuana
plants.  J.A. 273-76.  The trial court denied Providence’s motion and imposed sentence.
This appeal followed.
II.     JURISDICTION AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Our jurisdiction over this appeal arises under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We review de
novo a district court’s denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal.  United States v.
Starnes, 583 F.3d 196, 206 (3d Cir. 2009) (internal citation omitted).  In deciding whether
the evidence was sufficient to sustain the conviction, we “review the record in the light
most favorable to the prosecution to determine whether any rational trier of fact could
have found proof of guilt[] beyond a reasonable doubt.”  United States v. Brodie, 403
F.3d 123, 133 (3d Cir. 2005) (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).  A claim of
insufficient evidence places “a very heavy burden” on an appellant.  United States v.
 The elements of the underlying offenses are as follows.  Count I of the indictment,1
possession with intent to distribute, requires that the government prove: “(1) knowing or
intentional[;] (2) possession[;] (3) with intent to distribute[;] (4) a controlled substance.”  United
States v. Lacy, 446 F.3d 448, 454 (3d Cir. 2006).
Count II of the indictment, manufacturing one hundred or more marijuana plants, requires
that the government prove that Providence knowingly or intentionally manufactured marijuana
and knew that marijuana was a controlled substance.  See 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and
(b)(1)(B)(vii).
Count III of the indictment, maintaining a drug-involved premises, requires that the
government prove that Providence “knowingly . . . use[d] . . . [a] place. . . temporarily . . .  for the
purpose of . . . manufacturing [a] controlled substance.”  21 U.S.C. § 856(a)(1).
4
Gonzalez, 918 F.2d 1129, 1132 (3d Cir. 1990).
III.     ANALYSIS
Providence argues that the government did not provide sufficient evidence that he
aided and abetted the three Counts charged, and that the quantity of marijuana possessed
is an element of the offenses that must be, and was not, established beyond a reasonable
doubt.
A. Sufficiency of the Evidence for Aiding and Abetting Liability
Providence first challenges the sufficiency of the evidence for aiding and abetting
all three Counts of the indictment.   One who aids and abets the possession, manufacture,1
or distribution of controlled substances in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) is liable as a
principal.  See 18 U.S.C. § 2.  To establish aiding and abetting, the government must
prove “the defendant associated himself with the criminal venture . . . participated in it as
something he wished to bring about, and . . . sought by his words or action to make it
succeed.”  United States v. Xavier, 2 F.3d 1281, 1288 (3d Cir. 1993); United States v.
5Carbo, 572 F.3d 112, 118 (3d Cir. 2009) (internal citations omitted) (“the government
must prove the defendant . . . knew of the commission of the substantive offense and
acted with the intent to facilitate it.”).   
 “Mere knowledge of the underlying offense is not sufficient for conviction” as an
aider and abetter; rather, “specific intent of facilitating the crime” is required.  United
States v. Gordon, 290 F.3d 539, 547 (3d Cir. 2002).  To prove the requisite intent, the
government can show the defendant “encouraged or helped the perpetrator.”  Xavier, 2
F.3d at 1288 (citing Gov’t of Virgin Islands v. Navarro, 513 F.2d 11 (3d Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 422 U.S. 1045 (1975)).  
Similarly, “[m]ere presence at the scene of a crime . . . does not alone make one an
‘aider or abetter.’”  United States v. Dixon, 658 F.2d 181, 189 (3d Cir. 1981) (internal
citations omitted).  Instead, “the jury must be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that
[the] defendant [did] something to forward the crime and . . . was a participant rather than
merely a knowing spectator.”  Id.  Sufficiency of the evidence to prove “participation” for
aiding and abetting rests upon a case-specific inquiry.  We have indicated that in certain
circumstances even “verbal encouragement of an assault” or remaining with a group after
its members disclose their intention to commit a crime is enough to establish
participation.  See United States v. Barber, 429 F.2d 1394, 1397 n.4 (3d Cir. 1970) (citing
Kuney v. Dutcher, 22 N.W. 866, 867 (Mich. 1885); People v. Hill, 233 N.E. 2d 367, 373
(Ill. 1968)). 
 As the government met its burden of proof as to the commission of Count I, the2
evidence was also sufficient for the lesser burdens needed to establish that Counts II and III were
committed.
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There was clearly enough evidence to allow a reasonable jury to find Providence
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of aiding and abetting Counts I - III of this indictment. 
First, the government established that the underlying crimes—possession with intent to
distribute, and manufacturing, one hundred or more marijuana plants, and use of a drug-
involved premises—were committed by either Providence or his co-Defendant
Rampersad.  The government proved the “possession” and “controlled substance” prongs
of possession with intent to distribute when its forensic chemist provided expert
testimony that the plants Officer Howell recovered were marijuana.  See J.A. 193. 
Howell’s testimony was also sufficient to establish an “intent to distribute” because of the
large number of plants he recovered.  J.A. 80-81.  Finally, the government established
“knowing or intentional” possession through surveillance videos showing that Providence
and Rampersad returned to the plants and helped water them.  See J.A. 212-13; 11B and
11C.  As Howell testified, there “was no real reason . . . to be out there” other than
marijuana cultivation, because “nothing was there.”  J.A. 214.  Moreover, the hidden and
abandoned location constituted evidence that the co-Defendants “attempted to hide . . .
the contraband,” evidence from which a jury could find constructive possession.   See2
United States v. Jenkins, 90 F.3d 814, 818 (3d Cir. 1996). 
This evidence was also sufficient to show that Providence aided and abetted the
commission of the underlying crimes.  The evidence discussed above establishes both that
7Providence had the requisite intent and that he “participated in [the underlying offenses]
as something he wished to bring about, and . . . sought by his words or action to make it
succeed.”  See Xavier, 2 F.3d at 1288.  Again, Officer Lynch identified Providence and
Rampersad as the two individuals in the car he pulled over on April 9, 2010, and testified
that he “saw both defendants messing with some plants” on surveillance videos 11B and
11C.  J.A. 239-40.  In these videos, Providence watered the plants, repotted them, and
brushed excess dirt from their roots.  See 11B and 11C; see also J.A. 70-71, 82, 84-90,
139.  Any suggestion that this evidence was not sufficient to support the conviction
therefore borders on frivolity.
B. Sufficiency of the Evidence as to Amount of Drugs in Counts I and II
Providence’s attempt to argue that he is entitled to relief because quantity is an
element of the offense that wasn’t proven beyond a reasonable doubt is equally without
merit.  Although the quantity of a controlled substance can increase penalties and must
therefore be established beyond a reasonable doubt, see United States v. Lacy, 446 F.3d
448 (3d Cir. 2006), Providence’s claim for relief ignores the fact that the jury
interrogatories established that the jury was convinced of the drug quantity beyond a
reasonable doubt.
Furthermore, the jury’s finding was clearly supported by the evidence.  Agent
Howell testified that he recovered over two hundred marijuana plants from the cultivation
site.  J.A. 79.  He testified that to be counted as an official plant, the marijuana must have
8an intact root structure, stem, and leaf.  See J.A. 106.  Scott Goodlin, a forensic chemist,
echoed Agent Howell’s testimony as to the elements required to count a plant for forensic
purposes.  J.A. 197.  He stated that his lab received packages on July 26, 2007 containing
the plants Agent Howell seized, but that he did not open or count them until August 6,
2007, because of a “backlog.”  J.A. 193-94.  Upon analyzing them, Goodlin counted only
sixty-four marijuana plants, and the rest were merely fragments with some stems or
leaves, but no intact root structure.  J.A. 197.  Goodlin explained, however, that the
number of countable plants likely decreased significantly during the two weeks between
receipt and analysis, because it was not uncommon for plants deprived of water and
nutrients to dry out and break into fragments—losing elements required to be counted as a
plant for forensic purposes.  J.A. 201-03.
Viewing this evidence in conjunction with the other testimony, photos, and DVD
surveillance of the cultivation site, a reasonable jury could have found beyond a
reasonable doubt that Providence possessed with intent to distribute, and manufactured,
one hundred or more marijuana plants in violation of § 841(b)(1)(B)(vii).
V.     CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the district court’s order denying
Providence’s motion for judgment of acquittal.
